Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. The vulnerability of our seaports to acts of terrorism in which cargo containers are utilized to transport the means to cause damage to our infrastructure, our people, and our economy is significant. This project will address the reality of the threat. It will investigate the measures being undertaken or considered to address our vulnerabilities to the threat and will analyze the anticipated effects of these measures in comparison with estimated costs and the means available to the stakeholders sharing the financial responsibilities for their implementation. A basic assumption is that a fail-safe program to ensure container security is improbable and cost-prohibitive. Therefore, by managing risk, priorities will be established.
"NO SILVER BULLET": MANAGING THE WAYS AND MEANS OF CONTAINER SECURITY
The globalized economy of the 21 st Century is dependent upon freely flowing trade that has been facilitated by increases in containerization of cargo and the use of multi-modal conveyances throughout the international shipping industry. The efficient use of cargo containers has transformed business processes that now rely heavily upon "just-in-time"
deliveries and reduced inventories. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center, expeditious, uninterrupted movement of ocean-going cargo is no longer a certainty. The new reality is that our nation is vulnerable to terrorist attacks on its people, infrastructure, and economy.
Seaports are the "critical gateways" 1 for international commerce. More than ninety-five percent of our non-North American foreign trade passes through our seaports. More than five thousand vessels carrying cargoes from around the world transit our ports each year. 2 More than seven million containers enter the country annually. 3 Delay or interruption to this flow is economically intolerable. In addition, while our seaports vary in size and traffic, most are located in or near major metropolitan areas, where attacks would leave large populations vulnerable. 4 For these reasons targeting U.S. seaports provides terrorists with a way to inflict significant consequences on our economy, as well as our citizens. Currently, most security professionals agree that no "silver bullet" exists to solve the container security problem, so "we deploy our finite resources and manpower against the highest risks in hope of preventing the most catastrophic and deadly scenarios."
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HOW REAL IS THE THREAT?
Consider the following condensed scenario posed by Robert Williscroft. "A container ship is putting into the Port of Long Beach, the largest port on the West Coast. A Coast Guard cutter is standing off the starboard side, awaiting permission to board the vessel for a routine customs and security inspection. The check is routine, but the Coast Guard inspects only two percent of incoming containers, which means that only a small percentage of incoming vessels are actually boarded. To the north, a Bahamian-registered container ship has just entered Puget Sound. The
Coast Guard waves this ship on. Protocol indicates that the next vessel will be boarded. Many miles to the east, a container ship makes its way to New York harbor. As in Seattle, the Coast Guard waves the ship on, since it had just boarded another vessel twenty minutes earlier.
Deep inside each vessel, in three containers well buried under dozens of other containers, three simple devices sense that all motion in the vessels has ceased. A set of timers starts.
Fifteen minutes later, the sensors determine that the vessels still have not moved, and begin to charge banks of capacitors from groups of lead-acid automobile batteries located nearby inside the containers. In a few seconds three igniters explode, ramming shaped blocks of plutonium against plutonium targets. In a heartbeat, nearly simultaneously in Long Beach, Seattle, and New York harbors, 10 kilotons of nuclear fire is unleashed dockside. For a thousand feet in all directions, everything is incinerated in a massive fireball. The blast front destroys everything but the most massive buildings for a mile beyond that. Hundreds of thousands die in less than a minute since the capacitor banks first discharged." 6 While this portrayal represents a fictitious scenario that a terrorist organization might use to inflict devastating damage to our people, our infrastructure, and our economy; the following accounts represent the real facts as we weigh the likelihood of a possible terrorist attack on a major U.S. seaport via the maritime industry. In 2001 a suspected member of the Al Qaeda terrorist network was arrested in Italy after he tried to stow-away in a shipping container heading to Toronto. The container was furnished with a bed, a toilet, and its own power source to operate the heater and recharge batteries. According to the Toronto Sun, the man also had a global satellite telephone, a laptop computer, an airline mechanic's certificate, and security passes for airports in Canada, Thailand, and Egypt. 7 A March 2002 report by Norwegian intelligence has identified twenty-three merchant vessels believed to be linked to al Qaeda.
Some of the vessels are thought to be owned outright by Osama bin Laden's business interests, while others are on long-term charter. 8 The Times of London reported that bin Laden used his ships to import into Kenya the explosives used to destroy the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 9 In October 2002, a French-flagged tanker was attacked by terrorists in a manner quite similar to the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. The attack resulted in 60,000 tons of oil being discharged into the waters off Yemen and killing one crew member. 10 In 2002 the FBI apprehended a U.S.-born Muslim convert suspected of being part of an al Qaeda cell attempting to set off a "dirty bomb" designed to scatter deadly radioactive material. 11 Just recently in Moldova, a former Soviet republic, dozens of rockets, whose warheads were outfitted with the so-called "dirty bombs," were reported to be missing from a depot near Trans-Dniester Tiraspol military airport.
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These accounts are factual. The terrorist threat to our seaports is real. Cargo containers provide terrorists with potential platforms that are numerous and unwieldy, as well as difficult and expensive to search. They present an easily accessible conveyance for a nuclear weapon or radiological "dirty bomb." As the result of inadequate security at points of origin and major seaports of embarkation and debarkation, our vulnerability to attack is significant. The U.S.
government and private industry cannot afford to be complacent and must come to consensus on appropriate security measures and standards. More importantly, the two must decide how, as mutual stakeholders, they will share the costs associated with the measures being considered for implementation.
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A WMD ATTACK AT A SEAPORT
An April 2003 study conducted by Abt Associates, Inc. assumed the detonation of a 10-20
Kiloton cargo container-delivered fission weapon on a major seaport or Washington, DC. The costs and consequences of such an attack were astounding. In the three possible scenarios examined, it was estimated that the disruption created in U.S. trade would cost from $100-200 billion. Property damage estimates ranged from $50-500 billion. Indirect cost estimates reached a high of $1.4 trillion. These indirect costs would be the result of global, long-term effects caused by the responses to such a WMD attack. Indirect costs would include items such as increases in insurance premiums, devalued stock prices for affected companies, slowing or shutting down of production lines, and loss of confidence in the "just-in-time" delivery process.
The loss of confidence in the "just-in-time" delivery process would result in manufacturers and wholesalers assuming increased inventory holdings to counter unpredictable trade flow. This increased inventory would cost an estimated $50-80 billion. While it is impossible to accurately place a dollar value on human life, the Abt study estimated that loss of life, which in Manhattan for instance could reach as high as one million deaths, would cost up to $3 trillion (30% of US GDP). 17 Any disruption to the flow of free trade will have significant costs.
However, the serious consequences of a WMD attack on a U.S. seaport would be devastating to our economy.
A MULTI-LAYERED APPROACH TO CONTAINER SECURITY
The U.S. government, in partnership with the international community and the private sector, has begun to address the container security issue in hopes of minimizing our vulnerabilities. Key points of vulnerability from origin to destination are readily identifiable and must be addressed. Overseas warehouses loading containers for export have weak controls and personnel usually lack detailed background checks. Seals attached to containers provide little additional security. Trucking companies offer little in-transit visibility for containers as they are shipped from warehouse to the ports of embarkation. At the terminals containers are at risk of tampering as they await upload aboard a container vessel. Security measures at terminals are often inadequate and the same personnel risks exist as are found at points of origin. Seals are seldom checked for signs of tampering prior to and during loading. Vessels may make multiple port calls before they reach their final destination and containers are subject to tampering at each stop along the route.
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While no "silver bullet" exists to provide a 100% secure cargo container environment, there appears to be consensus that the optimal approach involves a system of systems -a multi-layered approach that incorporates security measures at all links in the supply chain from manufacturer to consumer. The key tenets of a comprehensive container security strategy include: risk analysis, container integrity, container tracking and tracing, and container load verification. 19 DHS has published a comprehensive strategy for port security that is based on:
Enhancing our Nation's Security, Shielding our Maritime Borders and Ports, Managing the Threats, Coordinating our Response, and Providing Leadership. In implementing this strategy, DHS has undertaken a number of initiatives designed to further reduce port vulnerabilities.
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The Port Security Grant Program, managed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), funds security planning and projects to improve dockside and perimeter security. In FY03 170 million dollars was distributed to our key ports, with the bulk of those funds going to our 17 strategic seaports designated for the deployment and redeployment of military cargo.
However, this represents only a fraction of what the American Association of Port Authorities considers necessary to address the myriad of security deficiencies at our U.S. seaports.
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The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a DHS program that incorporates teamwork among domestic and foreign port authorities. The program is designed to identify, target, and search high-risk cargo at ports of embarkation. CSI consists of four core elements: (1) Establishing security criteria for identifying high-risk containers based on advance information. (2) Prescreening containers at the earliest possible point. (3) Using technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers. (4) Developing secure and "smart" containers. 23 The program has expanded to 20 major ports around the world, which account for about 68% of our total container imports. Under the CSI program, the screening for weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers is accomplished by highly-skilled Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials deployed to work in concert with their equally proficient host nation counterparts. This is considered an essential positive step in reducing our vulnerability to terrorist attack, as many would characterize inspections at the ports of debarkation as being too late. securing, and manifesting the contents of a shipment of goods in a container. 26 In addition, OSC will demonstrate various methods to ensure that the information and documentation associated with these shipments is complete, accurate, and secure from unauthorized access.
The project will ultimately gauge the security of the supply chain with these new procedures in order to determine their viability.
The Center. This deadline enables advance boarding of suspect vessels well before they reach our shores. Ship operators have shown little objection to this rule, however they have expressed concern with enforcement of the manifesting of crew members due to the difficulty in performing required background checks. New biometric technologies are being developed to assist in this effort.
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LEVERAGING NEW AND EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES
Fixed drive-through, crane mounted, and mobile screening systems are now available to detect radiological emissions. These sensitive radiation monitoring systems utilizing glass fiber sensors are capable of detecting nuclear materials in shipping containers. New gamma ray technologies are being developed by companies such as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Gamma ray sources provide a safer and more cost-effective solution to cargo screening than traditional x-ray systems. These new systems have a throughput of up to ten times greater than x-ray systems. Gamma ray detection devices allow for minimal delay in movement of cargo, with cycle times less than a minute per container, and they offer the possibility of 100% screening of cargo at foreign ports. 32 The Savi Transportation Security System is a web-based application that offers continuous online cargo tracking, security monitoring, and management of containers and their contents. It provides an automatic, electronic audit trail that enables a container and contents to be verified and fast-tracked through an inspection. It enables users to consistently monitor container integrity, verifies that a container was loaded at a secure site according to approved procedures, and it gathers data to conduct a virtual inspection prior to arrival. 33 DHS is developing the ACE Project (Automated Commercial Environment). ACE is the initial modernization project that will expedite trade across U.S. borders while providing the tools, information, and foresight needed to target suspect trade shipments faster and more accurately. This $1.7 billion endeavor will provide CBP with a multi-agency information sharing and targeting system. 34 It will link a variety of databases to include those of shippers, freight forwarders, importers and exporters with DHS, TSA, CBP, and various law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The shipping industry is investigating the production of a "smart container." This container would have technological systems and sensors in place to monitor its contents, integrity, and location. Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID) would be affixed to each container and would transmit a signal that would be incorporated with a GPS system to provide continuous status of its location. Electronic seals would be connected to the devices to monitor the integrity of the container. In addition, the technology exists to seal each container with a metallic flake caulk that emits a unique magnetic signature. Using a hand-held device the magnetic signature can be read into an encrypted database. The container can then be scanned electronically at each handling as it transits from origin to destination. Breeching of the container would alter the magnetic signature and preclude a container with an altered magnetic signature from entry into the port of debarkation until physically inspected. 35 Low-cost sensors are available to monitor for explosives or other hazardous chemicals. Currently the industry has not yet agreed upon a standard for the "smart container" with added cost being another consideration.
THE COSTS OF IMPROVED CONTAINER SECURITY
The federal funding provided thus far represents only a small portion of the anticipated costs for improvements recommended by the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security of U.S. Seaports. Grant applications far exceed the available resources. The USCG has estimated port security requirements will cost about $4.4 billion over ten years. 36 Heightened national security alert levels require ports to assume additional costs beyond that figure, as well.
U.S. seaports estimate that it will take $2.2 billion to address immediate needs to meet proposed requirements. 37 If we were to extend the requirements to every U.S. manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, shipper, and warehouse establishment and assume that each invested fifty thousand dollars in personnel and technological security improvements, the cumulative bill would exceed $83 billion. 38 Arguably money is more effectively spent ensuring that a weapon of mass destruction never finds its way into a cargo container bound for the United States. It is too early to gauge the costs of implementation of MTSA, CSI, C-TPAT, and the 24-hour and 96-hour rules. Initial estimates of the cost of the 24-hour rule vary greatly from 281 million to $10 billion per year. 43 The FY04 proposed budget for CSI was $61 million 44 and the proposed budget for C-TPAT was $12.1 million. 45 As previously stated, the ACE project will cost an estimated $1.7 billion to provide the CBP with the linkages to various databases required to address our vulnerabilities. At the port CBP ensures that only manifested containers are discharged. Video surveillance equipment purchased with TSA grant money monitors the container staging areas.
END STATE: THE LAYERED STRATEGY COMES TOGETHER
Upon closer inspection, it is noted that the container seal is scratched and that the container had been in a vulnerable area aboard the vessel. The container is then designated for a nonintrusive gamma ray screening. The results of the screening appear to match the manifest and the container is released for shipment to the importer and arrives at its final destination with cargo intact.
WHO WILL PAY FOR CONTAINER SECURITY?
While the stakeholders agree on the multi-layered, risk managed end-state for container security as depicted above, there is major disagreement on how much of the burden each stakeholder should assume. The estimated cost is substantial, but the cost of inaction might prove to be tremendous. However, each of the major stakeholders is likely to reap significant benefits from the recommended or mandated improvements. Tighter security measures could result in the government obtaining more than $2 billion in additional tariffs from identification of cargo that had previously been fraudulently misidentified or unidentified. 46 Furthermore, it is estimated that governments would realize over $16 billion in additional tobacco tax revenues alone through these improvements. 47 Increased security would have an impact on reducing illegal drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The manufacturing and shipping industries would experience sizable gains through decreased theft and pilferage. The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates the cost of container cargo losses between $10-12 billion per year. 48 In addition, industry would benefit from lowered insurance premiums, reduced delays, faster processing times, improved inventory control, and decreased payroll through leveraging information technology. These gains may, in fact, outweigh the costs of the security improvements being mandated or considered. The Strategic Council on Security Technology (SCST), an independent industry group of shipping companies, port operators, and Information
Technology vendors conducted a test using web-based software, RFID tags, electronic seals, and other technologies. Over sixty companies shipped more than eight hundred containers across three continents and realized savings that ranged from $378-462 per container. With more than 7 million containers entering U.S. seaports in 2002, the cumulative savings would be approximately $3 billion. 49 Deciding how to pay for planned security improvements is a challenge. Given the importance of our seaports to our economic infrastructure, it has been argued by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) that additional fees and taxes upon the ports are unacceptable. There already exist 124 different user fees and taxes, which contribute to a combined $22 billion of federal revenues generated by the ports annually. 50 The AAPA advocates the federal government assume the major portion of the increased security costs.
In us to have that very important public discussion with regard to the balance between public and private dollars to pay for security around private-sector assets," Ridge said.
Michael Connors, of Booz, Allen, Hamilton, also speaking at the 2 nd Annual U.S. Maritime Security Expo and Conference, concluded that with the federal government running record deficits, nothing is on the horizon for other than seed money for technology development. He urged a public education effort to explain increased costs to consumers, because one way or the other they will be paying for it.
MILITARY BENEFITS
During a large scale deployment, the Department of Defense normally transports about 95 percent of all military equipment and supplies through 17 designated strategic seaports in the continental United States. 52 The Furthermore, technological developments in "smart containers" would offer the military great utility as it strives to improve In-Transit and Total Asset Visibility, as well as provide a more secure container. Improvements in automated cargo documentation and tracking systems have potential military benefit as they would enhance the distribution process and provide better support to the warfighter.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The stakeholders must continue to work together to address the variety of issues related to improving maritime security and reducing our vulnerability to a terrorist attack utilizing a cargo container. The multi-layered measures developed thus far to ensure adequate levels of security at all nodes of the supply chain need to be fully funded and implemented. These mandated and recommended systems of solutions may not be as cost-prohibitive as many believe. Residual benefits, such as increased tax revenues, lower insurance premiums, and cargo loss prevention resulting from security improvements, will fund much of the added cost and government and industry must reach an accord as to how best fund what remains.
The strategy of extending our defensive perimeter to the foreign cities and ports where our container imports originate is the right strategy. The federal government should continue to work multilaterally and bilaterally within the international trade community to ensure that the necessary systems are in place to protect the citizens of the U.S., our infrastructure, and our economy.
Currently CBP is providing technical assistance to those countries that are not financially capable of implementing security measures to a level that would guarantee the safety of U.S.
interests. We cannot afford the risk of allowing non-compliant countries to continue their trade with U.S. companies. Our federal government has two options with these non-compliant countries. Either we restrict trade with them or subsidize their efforts to comply with international and U.S. standards. It is in our best interest, however, to promote free trade with these lesser nations and not hinder their development. Therefore, our government should subsidize the development of improved screening technologies and the acquisition of necessary systems in sufficient quantities to those nations lacking adequate means to do so. In addition,
we should expand CSI to provide trained inspection personnel at all international seaports with commerce links to the United States.
The private sector should assume the major portion of the cost for meeting improved security standards from point of origin in the supply chain and through movement to the ports of embarkation. Manufacturers, freight consolidators, freight forwarders, and shippers should invest in providing adequate personnel to oversee the stuffing of containers on their loading docks. Government should continue to provide incentives for companies to do so. Physical security costs in this link should also be assumed by the private sector. Manufacturers must invest in "smart containers" and improved cargo tracking systems. The residual benefits realized from these security improvements would be significant and would offset a major portion of the cost of implementation. Those costs not offset should ultimately be passed on to the customer.
The federal government should continue to subsidize physical security and training at our U.S. ports through continued grants. The USCG is assigned the mission of providing adequate waterside security for our domestic ports. Within the new domestic security environment
Congress should consider increasing USCG end-strength and providing the appropriate funding to accomplish the expanded mission.
State and local governments reap the benefits of additional tax revenues generated from well-operated ports. Therefore, state and local governments are stakeholders, as well, and
should assume a portion of the costs of improving landside security at our domestic ports.
These ports, whether they be state or privately operated, should also invest in providing hightech screening systems, as significant security enhancements would likely attract additional cargo traffic, thus resulting in additional profits to offset the initial security investments.
EPILOGUE
DHS has no "silver bullet" to assist with its monumental assignment. The formidable tasks of coordinating and working with the many involved agencies to provide the required security to our nation's seaports will not easily be accomplished. The MTSA, CSI, C-TPAT, SST, and OSC are significant steps in the right direction to help the U.S. reduce the vulnerability of its seaports to terrorist attack from water-borne cargo containers. While these represent potential ways, the necessary means to accomplish the desired end have yet to be fully identified. Debate over responsibilities in assuming costs is on-going, as "just-in-time" industry standards, finite resource allocations to DHS, and limited resources available to the ports hinder the total implementation of all measures required to ensure maximum security. Currently we have a "managed-risk, means-based" strategy, addressing areas of concern on a priority basis. The above recommendations provide a framework for addressing responsibilities. The American public can only hope it will not take a direct attack on a U.S. seaport to provide the impetus for the federal government and industry, as well as the other stakeholders, to determine the appropriate level of funding that each must provide to secure this vital component of our 
